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TRADING WATER: USING TRADABLE PERMITS TO
PROMOTE CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
OF AN INCREASINGLY SCARCE RESOURCE
ABSTRACT
Growing populations and changing climate patterns are causing water
shortages in areas that have not previously experienced such water scarcity.
Governments are forced to implement short-term ad hoc measures to address
shortages because they have not implemented long-term conservation and
efficient-use policies. Permanent policies that conserve and more efficiently
allocate water resources should be implemented to prevent, or more effectively
manage, water shortages.
This Comment argues that a free-market system for water-use rights should
be implemented to address and prevent water shortages. A water market
system would require that secure property rights be attached to water use and
that those rights be freely tradable. Current water-rights regimes used in the
United States are not sufficient to support such a market system because
current regimes do not grant secure property rights in water use, and it is
unclear to what extent water-use rights can be transferred. Therefore, a
market system under the current water-rights regimes would not be able to
maximize its potential to promote efficient allocation of water resources.
This Comment argues that tradable permits for water use should be used as
the currency of a water market system. A water use permit would secure for its
holder a right to a certain level of water use and would be freely tradable. The
aggregate level of sustainable water withdrawal and consumption would be
determined by the state, and the water-use permits would be distributed to
current users at no cost. The amount of use allowed by the permit would be
based on each user’s current and historical water use. The permits could then
be traded in a market, encouraging efficient use, conservation, and the highest
economic allocation of water resources.
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INTRODUCTION
Due to growing demand from expanding populations and industry and an
increasing frequency of drought conditions, water shortages in the United
States have been increasing.1 Some commentators believe that global warming
has contributed to more frequent drought conditions, a trend they believe will
continue to worsen.2 To ensure water is available for basic needs, policy
makers have implemented temporary conservation measures such as water
rationing,3 and restrictions on watering lawns, filling swimming pools, and
washing cars.4
In 2009 as California appeared to be facing its third drought year in a row,
the state considered managing the shortage by implementing rationing policies
that would reduce users’ water access by up to twenty percent.5 The U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, a water provider in California,6 planned to cut off
water for agricultural use in the Central Valley region of the state and cut the
water allotment for municipalities and industrial users in half.7 One irrigation
specialist at a commercial farm that also used its own wells and pipelines said

1 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle
over the ‘Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 828 (2005) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles] (noting
that the southeastern U.S. region experienced the worst drought in its recorded history in the 1980s and still
worse drought conditions at the beginning of the 21st century); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water
Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 9, 10 (2002) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Water Allocation] (stating that in the eastern half of the United
States, growing demand and erratic climate patterns have caused more frequent shortages); Felicity Barringer,
Signs of Another California Drought Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at A15 (“California, just finished with its
second consecutive year of drought, might well be facing a third.”); see also Janet C. Neuman, Federal Water
Policy: An Idea Whose Time Will (Finally) Come, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 110–11 (2001) (noting that the
problem is exacerbated by the fact that population is growing fastest in areas with less water).
2 E.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.01, at 9-10,
9-11 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelly eds., repl. vol. ed. 2007) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Regulated
Riparianism] (noting that climate change is predicted to cause increasing frequency of both droughts and
floods); Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Robert H. Abrams, Climate Change and Freshwater Resources, 22
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 30 (2008) (noting that scientists predict climate change will have an adverse impact
on water resources).
3 See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 1 (reporting that California may impose water rationing).
4 See, e.g., Stacy Shelton & John C. Perry, Only Toughest Ban Reduced Water Use, ATLANTA J.CONST., Feb. 24, 2008, at D1 (reporting on water conservation measures implemented in Georgia during
drought conditions).
5 Ari B. Bloomekatz, U.S. Plans to Tighten Tap for Farmers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at B3.
6 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation operates dams and reservoirs in the western United States and sells
water in the wholesale market and to agricultural users. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: About Us,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
7 Bloomekatz, supra note 5.
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that, under the drought conditions, he would be happy if the farm received onesixth of the agricultural water it received under normal conditions.8
It is apparent that in future times of drought and water shortage, temporary
conservation measures will not be sufficient to preserve adequate water
resources, particularly in areas of continuing population growth.9
Compounding the problem, population growth often takes place in areas that
do not have adequate water resources to begin with.10 Thus, more permanent
measures will be required to solve the water shortage problem.11 This
Comment argues that a more effective and permanent water conservation
strategy for state governments would be (1) to cap or limit water use at a
predetermined sustainable level; (2) to allocate among existing users tradable
or transferable withdrawal permits that grant property rights in water use and
that collectively permit aggregate water use no greater than the predetermined
cap; and (3) to facilitate a free market for the trading of such water-use
permits. These permits would give their holders the right to use a certain
amount of water by withdrawing it from a water source.12
A cap on the total level of water use would enable policy makers to ensure
that water resources are maintained at a sustainable level.13 The initial
8

Id.
See Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 34 (“[W]e must reform water law and policy to emphasize
conservation and efficient, environmentally sound allocation.”); Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The
Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 601, 603 (2006) (arguing that conservation and more efficient allocation are the solutions to inadequate water
supply); see also Stacy Shelton, Atlanta Water Supply Precarious; Without Conservation, Future Looks Glum,
ATLANTA J.- CONST., June 27, 2005, at E1 (citing district water plans, reporting that water shortages are
projected in north Georgia, which includes Atlanta, unless there are “aggressive conservation measures and
new lakes to store water”).
10 See Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of Tradable Property Rights to Water, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 49 (2005) (“Increasingly in the United States, commercial activities and growing
population centers have developed in areas with scarce water resources.”); Neuman, supra note 1, at 110–11.
11 Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12 The distinction should be made between the right to withdraw water, which would be attached to the
permits this Comment proposes, and the possession or ownership rights of particular water from a particular
source. This distinction is important because a withdrawal right can be transferred to a different location that
has a different water source. See Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 266 (2006) (a tradable permit system does not “privatiz[e] the resource;” it “privatizes the
right to access the resource”); see also James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation
States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 439 (2004) (explaining that water’s physical
properties makes “it impossible, with some exceptions, to actually possess the same water for an extended
period,” but that this “is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle to water marketing”). For a further
discussion of transferring a tradable permit for water use to a location other than where the permit was initially
allocated, see infra Part II.A.2.
13 See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 265 (describing the basic attributes of a cap-and-trade system).
9
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allocation of water-use rights would be based on existing levels of actual use,
not the level of use that would attach through current water-rights laws.14 By
then allowing water-use permits to be bought and sold in a market
environment, water could be allocated more efficiently because the holder of a
permit would have an incentive to sell it in the market to a user who values it
more highly.15
Although there are economic benefits to a market system, there are also
problems that may arise in such a system, particularly when applied to a
precious resource such as water. Criticisms of water markets include concerns
that states may be unable to prevent water from being transferred and used outof-state,16 that smaller agricultural users and consumers may not be able to
afford to participate in the market,17 and that transaction costs associated with
implementing and facilitating the system will erode any gains that might have
been attainable.18
Any change in water rights law would need to be implemented by the
states.19 The federal government has implemented legislation addressing
specific issues related to water resources;20 however, state law governs water
14 See infra Part I for a discussion of current water-rights regimes. For a discussion of the system
proposed by this Comment, see infra Part III.
15 See generally Huffman, supra note 12, at 432 (“[A] well functioning market is the most effective and
efficient institution to allocate scarce resources.”); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and
Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 569, 572 (2001) (describing emission permit trading systems as reducing “aggregate emissions to the
chosen aggregate level for the least cost” when there is an active market); Janet C. Neuman, Have We Got a
Deal for You: Can the East Borrow from the Western Water Marketing Experience?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
449, 497 (2004) (“Subjecting water to market forces such as price signals can promote more efficient water
use . . . .”); Richard B. Stewart, Panel I: Liberty, Property, and Environmental Ethics, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411,
414 (1994) (“The advantages of . . . tradable permits are quite clear in economic terms.”); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 175, 176–77 (2003) (arguing
for and describing benefits of applying economic theory to environmental regulation). But see Draper, supra
note 10, at 49 (noting that imposing economics on water allocation may have “unintended consequences that
outweigh its benefits”).
16 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 53.
17 See, e.g., Wilson Barmeyer, Note, The Problem of Reallocation in a Regulated Riparian System:
Examining the Law in Georgia, 40 GA. L. REV. 207, 237–38 (2005) (noting the possibility of “inequitable
allocation of water dependant on economic wealth”).
18 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 51–52 (discussing transaction costs and externalities). For a
discussion of the criticisms of a market for water, see infra Part II.B.
19 See Huffman, supra note 12, at 442 (noting the possibility of a federal water rights law, but that “it
would be very disruptive to shift from the well-established state water rights regimes”).
20 See Neuman, supra note 1, at 107–08, 113 (noting that federal legislation has addressed “water supply,
pollution, dams, hydropower development, navigation, flood control, fisheries, and research” and that the
federal government spends more than ten billion dollars annually on water programs).
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rights.21 Although implementation of a tradable permit market for water at the
federal level could impose a uniform system across all the states, such a
change in the existing law would introduce issues of federalism that are
beyond the scope of this Comment.22 Instead, this Comment focuses on a
structure of a market for tradable permits that could be implemented and
tailored as needed by each state to conserve and efficiently allocate its water
resources.
In addition to arguing that a cap-and-trade system for allocating water use
should be implemented to address water shortages, this Comment demonstrates
why the two current water-rights systems—riparian rights in the East and prior
appropriation in the West—and their regulated variations cannot support such
a system.23 Property rights in water use and the extent to which water-use
rights can be transferred—characteristics that are essential for a robust and
efficient permit trading market—are uncertain in both riparian rights and prior
appropriation systems.24 Therefore, this Comment argues that a new waterrights system that provides for water-use permits that have vested property
rights and that are freely tradable is necessary for a market system that
maximizes its potential to conserve and efficiently allocate water resources.
Part I of this Comment discusses the water-rights regimes currently used in
the United States. Part II discusses the various design considerations and
structures of tradable permit systems, how tradable permit systems have been
used in other contexts,25 and how they might be used in a water-market system.
Part III proposes and describes a market system that uses as its currency
tradable permits for water withdrawal and that attempts to minimize the risks
associated with water markets, while maintaining the gains in conservation and
economic efficiency promoted by such a system.

21 See Zach Willey & Tom Graff, Federal Water Policy in the United States—An Agenda for Economic
and Environmental Reform, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 325, 347 (1988) (“State water laws have established
rights to use water under appropriative, riparian, correlative, and other conditions.”).
22 See Neuman, supra note 1, at 114–16 (arguing for a federal water-use policy but stating that “a major
political barrier preventing the development of a rational, federal water policy is the tension of federalism
itself”). For a discussion of why a federal water use policy is a good idea, see Neuman, supra note 1.
23 See infra Parts I.A.3 & I.B.2.
24 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 12, at 443 (“One cannot overemphasize the importance of secure, welldefined, and enforceable property rights. The rights must be exclusive, universal, and transferable.”). For a
discussion of the why both systems are inadequate for a water-market system, see infra Parts I.A.3 and I.B.2.
25 Tradable permits have been used to limit pollution and regulate use of common resources such as
habitats and fisheries. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 616 (2000).
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I. CURRENT WATER-LAW REGIMES AND WHY THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT A
WATER-MARKET SYSTEM
This Part explores current water-law regimes used in the United States and
explains why they would not adequately support a tradable permit watermarket system. Section A discusses the historical common law riparian rights
system generally used in the eastern states and explains how that system has
been modified by state legislatures into its current form. Section B discusses
the prior appropriation system generally used in the western states.
A. Riparian Systems and Their Regulated Progeny
This section discusses common law riparian rights and how those common
law rights systems have been modified by state legislatures. It also discusses
why neither common law riparian rights nor their legislatively-modified
variations would adequately support a market for tradable water-use permits.
1. Common Law Riparian Rights
Common law riparian rights establish and govern the rights of water users
to access and consume water resources.26 The riparian rights doctrine
developed in the eastern part of the United States, and its application has
generally been limited to that area.27 Riparian rights are a common property
system, which means that for the most part users are given discretion to decide
how they use the resource.28 The doctrine is based on the theory that land
appurtenant to a body of water has a “bundle of rights” associated with that
physical proximity.29 For purposes of this Comment, the most important of
these is the right to use and consume water because it results in depletion of the
resource.30
Common consumptive uses include irrigation, household
distribution through public utilities, and industrial processing.31
26

Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 11.
See id. at 9 (noting that riparian rights developed east of Kansas City, where water was abundant, and
appropriative rights were used west of Kansas City, where water was more scarce).
28 Id.
29 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
2, § 6.01(a), at 6-7 [hereinafter Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights]; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 843 (1979) (“The term ‘riparian land’ . . . means a tract of land that borders on a
watercourse or lake, whether or not it includes a part of the bed of the watercourse or lake.”).
30 See Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, supra note 29, § 6.01(a)(4), at 6-70 (“Consumptive
uses create interferences with competing uses that are permanent.”). The bundle of rights also includes, but is
not necessarily limited to, the right to access the water, the right to build a pier, the right to accretions
(sedimentary deposits), and the right to “own the subsoil of nonnavigable streams and other ‘private’ waters.”
27
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When common law riparian rights developed in the early nineteenth
century,32 there was no apparent shortage of water in eastern states, and
therefore no apparent need to restrict water use.33 Thus, under what is
generally known as the reasonable use standard, a riparian land owner has the
right to unlimited reasonable use of a water source, subject only to the
reasonable use rights that other riparian users have to the same body of water.34
Under this rule, the only consideration is whether a use interferes with another
riparian’s35 right to reasonable use of the source; the effect that a use has on the
body of water itself is not relevant.36 Under the rule adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the reasonableness of the use is determined by
consideration of a number of factors including the purpose, social value, and
economic value of the use.37 Traditional reasonable-use common law holds
that a non riparian use38 of a water source that affects a riparian use in any way
is per se unreasonable.39 Courts in most riparian states still apply this strict
common law rule to nonriparian use.40

Id. § 6.01(a), at 6-8. Courts make a distinction between uses which are consumptive and those that are not
consumptive. As Dellapenna notes that “[a]mong the most common non-consumptive uses recognized by the
law have been navigation, fishing, hunting, and swimming.” Id. § 6.01(a)(3), at 6-60, 6-61.
31 See id. § 6.01(a)(4), at 6-69, 6-70. Other consumptive uses include animal husbandry, mineral mining,
and steam-generated power. Id.
32 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 11 n.12 (noting that Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas.
472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312), is “often cited as the first true riparian rights case”).
33 See id. at 9.
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979) (“A riparian proprietor is subject to liability for
making an unreasonable use of the water of a watercourse or lake that causes harm to another riparian
proprietor’s reasonable use of water or his land.”); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under
“Pure” Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(d), at 7-48 [hereinafter
Dellapenna, Right to Consume] (describing the reasonable-use theory of riparian rights).
35 Riparian refers to an owner of riparian land. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (8th ed. 2004).
36 See Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.02(d), at 7-49 (noting that courts will find
liability where another riparian suffers “unreasonable injury”).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979). In addition, the Restatement lists the following
factors: level of harm caused by the use, the ability of one of the users to avoid the harm, the ability of each
user to meet their needs using less water, the protection of existing economic value in the use, and the fairness
of causing the harmful user to bear the loss from fewer use rights. Id.; cf. Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra
note 1, at 15 n.36 (explaining that many cases only consider economic factors: “These [non-economic]
principles figure prominently in the Restatement (Second) even if they do not figure prominently in the
cases.”).
38 According the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[n]onriparian uses are those made neither on nor in
connection with the use of riparian land, and include irrigation of nonriparian land and use in manufacturing
on nonriparian land, even though the land belongs to the owner of riparian land. They also include the
diversion and sale of water for consumption by nonriparian customers of water companies and inhabitants of
cities.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 cmt. a (1979).
39 Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.02(d)(1), at 7-54. As will be discussed in Parts II
and III of this Comment, a tradable permit water-market system is not viable unless nonriparian use is allowed
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Since common law riparian rights accrue to the rights-holder through
ownership of land that is appurtenant to the water source,41 in the early
development of common law riparian rights, the rights were often transferable
only as an attachment to the appurtenant land.42 Over time, however,
exceptions to that common law rule developed.43 Some courts have allowed
transfer of riparian rights to a nonriparian user apart from the appurtenant land,
but the alienability of the rights often depends upon whether the contemplated
use is consumptive or non-consumptive.44 As Professor Dellapenna notes,
grants by riparians allowed by a state would bind the grantor, but “the extent to
which the grant conveys rights [to the grantee] against any riparians other than
the grantor is far from clear.”45 This uncertainty demonstrates the difficulty in
determining what standard of “reasonable use” should attach to a transfer of
rights from a riparian user on appurtenant land to a nonriparian user.46
2. Regulated Riparianism
Legislative modifications of riparian rights are commonly referred to as
regulated riparianism,47 and they are generally intended to address water
supply shortages.48 Commentators have concluded that common law riparian
rights without any legislative modification are not well suited to allocate water
during water shortages because the system is limited in its ability to restrict
use, and disputes among users require the expense, time, and uncertainty of

to occur. See id. § 7.04, at 7-108 (“There is . . . no reason to believe that the economically most productive use
of water from a particular waterbody will always lie on contiguous land.”).
40 Id. § 7.02(d)(1), at 7-54, 7-55. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and courts in New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Georgia have rejected the common law rule that nonriparian use is per se unreasonable. Id.
Some states have passed legislation that may be interpreted to overrule the common law rule, but, as Professor
Dellapenna concludes, the question is often not directly addressed and, therefore, the status of the common law
rule is uncertain in many states. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(2), at 9-70
(discussing these legislative modifications in various states).
41 See Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.01, at 7-2 (noting that the “basic concept of
riparian rights” is that each land owner next to the water has equal rights to the other appurtenant land owners).
42 Id. § 7.04, at 7-107.
43 See generally id. at 7-108 (explaining that every state has, to varying degrees, loosened the restriction
on alienability of riparian rights).
44 Id. § 7.04(a)(3), at 7-117.
45 Id.
46 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 17–18 (noting the uncertainty as to whose level of
“reasonable use” is acquired by a non-riparian user).
47 E.g., Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.01, at 9-17 & n.51.
48 See generally id. at 9-15 (discussing the conditions that led to development of regulated riparianism).
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litigation to resolve.49 Dellapenna has concluded that nineteen of thirty-one
eastern states have implemented “comprehensive regulated riparian[ism].”50
The most common feature of regulated riparianism is a permit requirement
for certain types and manners of use.51 Common uses that trigger permit
requirements are (1) withdrawals over a certain amount,52 (2) withdrawals
from certain sources,53 and (3) inter-basin transfers of water.54 It is not entirely
clear whether regulated riparianism relaxes restrictions on water rights
transfers to nonriparians because the statutes often do not directly address the
issue.55 Dellapenna has suggested that the best interpretation in such cases
may be that the legislatures implicitly intended to leave the common law rule
in place.56
Regulated riparian statues also tend to exempt certain water users, often
weakening the statute’s intended effect.57 Common explicit permit exemptions
in regulated riparian statutes include agricultural use,58 domestic use,59 and
uses that were already established when the permit system was implemented.60
Groundwater is often regulated within the same system as surface water,
extending the reach of the regulations to more consumptive uses.61 Most

49 See id. § 9.01, at 9-12, 9-13, § 9.03, at 9-52 (summarizing criticisms of common law riparian rights as
an allocation system during water shortages).
50 Id. § 9.03, at 9-54 (citing statutes in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
51 See id. § 9.03(a), at 9-62 (“Easily the most significant innovation under regulated riparianism, the
feature that most sharply sets it apart from traditional riparian rights, is that direct users of water must have a
permit from a state administrative agency in order to be entitled to use water.”).
52 See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 12-5-96 (2009) (requiring permit for groundwater withdrawals greater
than 100,000 gallons per day).
53 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 9-53 (citing 615 ILL. COMP. STAT.
50/1–50/14 (2009) (requiring permits for withdrawals from Lake Michigan)).
54 See id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. 49-21-10 to -80 (2009)).
55 Id. § 9.03(a)(2), at 9-70.
56 Id.
57 See id. § 9.03(a)(3) (discussing exemptions from permit requirement in regulated riparian systems).
58 See id., at 9-76, 9-77 (citing statues exempting agricultural use to varying extents in Kentucky,
Maryland, Georgia, Michigan, Iowa, Maryland, and Minnesota).
59 See id., at 9-75 (citing statutes explicitly exempting domestic use in Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Maryland, Minnesota, and Mississippi, and statutes that permit withdrawal amounts so large as to effectively
exempt domestic use in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin).
60 See id., at 9-77 (“Most of the statutes either exempt at least some uses established on the effective date
of the statute from the permit requirement or guarantees an initial permit to established uses.”).
61 Id. § 9.03(a)(1), at 9-66 (noting that “fourteen of the nineteen regulated riparian states” have included
ground water in their regulated riparianism laws).
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states, however, exclude from the permitting system “diffuse”62 water bodies
by (1) expressly excluding them, (2) expressly applying the scheme to only
certain water bodies, (3) exempting lakes and ponds, (4) exempting water
bodies contained on the property of a single owner, or (5) exempting regulation
of diffuse water bodies except in times of shortage.63 Dellapenna notes that
these exemptions largely benefit agricultural uses and that “they obviously
impair the administering agency’s ability to undertake effective management in
the face of system-wide shortages.”64 Government subsidies, which can
increase agricultural water use, exacerbate the problem.65 The permit
exemptions mentioned above are often based more on political preferences
than any societal benefits rationale, so they “undermine the entire scheme of
regulating uses in the public interest.”66
Regulated riparian systems that exempt agricultural users adversely affect
policy makers’ ability to effectively regulate water use in the aggregate
because agricultural use comprises such a large portion of consumptive uses.67
One of the best examples of this problem is the set of exemptions for
agricultural use in Georgia’s regulation system.68 The Ground-water Use Act
of 197269 and the Georgia Water Quality Control Act,70 which was first passed
in 1964, both require certain water users to obtain permits from the state before
using water resources. The basic requirement of the two laws is that any user
withdrawing more than 100,000 gallons per day of water from a ground or
surface source must first obtain a permit.71 Agricultural users face less
62 Diffuse water can generally be described as surface water that is not part of a defined water body. See,
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (2009) (describing diffused surface water as “water occurring upon the
surface of the ground other than in contained water bodies”); Court Reports, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 445,
466 (2008) (describing diffuse surface waters as “waters from rain or melting snows flowing over land and not
part of a defined watercourse”).
63 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(1), at 9-67 (describing various state
laws with respect to diffuse surface waters).
64 Id. at 9-69.
65 Willey & Graff, supra note 21, at 326.
66 Dellapenna, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3), at 9-80 (“To exempt such activities . . . serves little purpose
other than capitulation to the political strength of the groups exempted.”).
67 See Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838 (labeling irrigation as “generally the most
heavily consumptive use of water”).
68 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that agricultural exemptions in Georgia
“go far beyond the exclusions of certain uses in other regulated riparian states”).
69 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-90 to -107 (2009). As the name suggests, this law applies to use of ground
water.
70 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-20 to -53 (2009). This law applies to use of surface water.
71 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(1)(A), 12-5-96(a)(1) (2009). See also Dellapenna, Water Allocation,
supra note 1, at 68–70 (describing the provisions of each statute).
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stringent requirements under the statutes.72 Both laws provide that a
withdrawal permit up to the operating capacity of a farm shall be issued for
any farm that used the water source prior to July 1, 1988, and applied for the
permit prior to July 1, 1991.73 Under both statutes, farm-use permits applied
for before April 20, 2006, or which are not within the Flint River basin,74 have
no expiration; permits applied for on or after April 20, 2006, for a farm within
the Flint River basin have a twenty-five-year term, but they are renewable at
the original withdrawal capacity unless the “original capacity would have
unreasonable adverse effects upon other water uses.”75 Under this regulation
scheme, policy makers in Georgia are limited in their ability to implement
conservation measures targeted at agricultural use.76 The permits that grant
agricultural-use rights are not determined by actual use, and they have either
no expiration dates or expiration dates that are long-term.77 Thus, the policy
makers have few options to regulate one of the largest categories of water use
in the state.78 This is particularly problematic in times of drought, during
which the need to conserve water is the greatest and the relative level of
agricultural use increases because of greater irrigation requirements.79

72

See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(a) (2009).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(a) (2009).
74 The Flint River flows through southwest Georgia. According to the River Basin Center at the
University of Georgia, “[t]he Flint River is approximately 350 miles long and drains an area of 8,460 square
miles.” Gretchen Loeffler & Judy L. Meyer, River Basin Ctr., Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin,
http://www.rivercenter.uga.edu/education/k12resources/basinsofga2.htm.
75 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(b)(1) (2009).
The permits may be transferred to
subsequent owners of the property, subject only to notification of the transfer to the state. Id. Changes in the
use or withdrawal capacity of the water permit must be applied for and approved by the state. Id.
76 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 216 (“[The exemptions] impair the state’s ability to manage its water
resources effectively.”).
77 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(b)(1) (2009).
78 See JULIA L. FANNING, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER USE IN GEORGIA, 2000; AND TRENDS,
1950-2000 (2003), available at http://cms.ce.gatech.edu/gwri/uploads/proceedings/2003/Fanning.pdf (noting
that irrigation use accounts for almost seventeen percent of water use from all sources, and fifty-one percent of
groundwater use in Georgia); Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72 (“Farm uses remain far and
away the largest use of water in Georgia.”).
79 See FANNING, supra note 78 (noting that more irrigation is required during droughts); Hall, Stuntz &
Abrams, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that demand for irrigation water will increase in areas where drier
conditions are expected).
73
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3. Why Neither Riparianism nor Regulated Riparianism Can Support a
Tradable Permit Market for Water
The most significant fundamental requirement for a successful and efficient
water market is that water-use rights also be secure property rights.80 It is
unlikely that buyers would be willing to participate in a market for rights if
those rights are not fully secure from forfeiture or interference by third
parties.81 Because common law riparian rights and current regulated riparian
systems have uncertain property rights,82 these systems cannot adequately
support a market for tradable water permits.83
Common law riparian rights are not sufficiently clear to support a market
system that uses tradable permits as its currency.84 Because a riparian’s rights
are based on the reasonable-use doctrine,85 those rights, in the amount and type
of use allowed, may change and evolve over time if the needs and uses of other
riparians change.86 This unstable balance of reasonableness among users
makes the riparian rights of competing users subject to change based on factors
that are out of the user’s control.87 This problem would likely be magnified in
a market system because riparian users would want to sell as many of their
riparian rights as possible, and it would be unclear how much of the shared

80 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 230 (“Clearly defined property rights are a prerequisite to any system
of water rights trading through a market.”); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right:
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 327 (2000) (“[M]ost
fundamental to the functioning of markets are the laws that define the property rights that form the ‘objects’ of
the market’s transactions . . . .”); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1495, 1533–34 (1999) (discussing tradable permits in fisheries, stating that “governments must provide
legal structures to ensure that those with property rights are able to vindicate them”); Huffman, supra note 12,
at 443 (“One cannot overemphasize the importance of secure, well-defined, and enforceable property rights.
The rights must be exclusive, universal, and transferable.”).
81 Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 230; Tietenberg, supra note 13, at 267 (“Confiscation of rights or simply
insecure rights could undermine the entire [market trading] process.”).
82 See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text. See also Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 231 (noting the
lack of clear property rights in water withdrawal permits in Georgia).
83 See Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 35 (“[R]ights in water are less certain than in many other
forms of property, making a true market difficult to achieve.”).
84 See Neuman, supra note 15, at 488 (stating riparian rights are “so poorly defined and open-ended as to
discourage investment”); supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
86 See Olivia S. Choe, Note, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of Scarcity,
113 YALE L.J. 1909, 1911 (2004) (describing how this inherent uncertainty in riparian rights has prevented
water markets); Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that litigation over water rights is
inefficient because court “rulings may soon be mooted by changed conditions”).
87 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 16 (“If either of the competing uses changes in
physical or economic terms, the calculus of reasonableness will change . . . .”).
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water resource would be allocated to each user. In addition, disputes over
common law riparian rights are settled in court based on a number of different
factors.88 Because different factors may be considered or prioritized
differently by different courts, riparian rights can be somewhat unpredictable.89
A second problem that makes common law riparian rights inadequate for a
tradable permit market is that it is unclear whether common law riparian rights
are transferable to nonriparian users, and if so, the extent of the rights that can
be transferred.90 If a water market is to function as efficiently as possible,
water-use rights must be transferable without regard to where the water will be
used.91 As Professor Dellapenna has noted, “[t]here is . . . no reason to believe
that the economically most productive use of water from a particular
waterbody will always lie on contiguous land. If riparian rights cannot be
transferred, then some water must be used at less than its most efficient use.”92
Regulated riparian systems are also imperfect for the implementation of
markets for tradable water permits. The extent of the property right granted
through a water-withdrawal permit is not always clear. For example, the
administering state agency imposes a reasonable-use requirement on the permit
when there are competing uses.93 It is also unclear in most regulated riparian
systems whether permits can be transferred.94
An equally significant problem with regulated riparian systems is certain
users often are exempt from the permit system.95 As discussed above, the
exemption of agricultural use from the permit scheme in many states prevents

88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979) (listing nine factors to be considered to
determine reasonableness of use).
89 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 16 (“Courts, as well as scholars, have considered this
[instability] a serious impediment to private investment in water development.”).
90 See id. at 17–18, 67 (noting the uncertainty as to whose level of reasonable use is acquired by a nonriparian user); supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
91 See Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.04, at 7-108 (noting that the most efficient use
will not always be on the riparian land).
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(e), (g) (2009); see also Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 231 (noting
that disputes have occurred when permit holders assert private property rights over groundwater); Neuman,
supra note 15, at 488 (noting that the problems with common law reasonable use are still present in regulated
riparianism; it is just administrative agencies, rather than courts, making the decision).
94 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 38 (“Usually there is no express provision for the
transfer of water rights or permits between potential users.”); Neuman, supra note 15, at 489. See supra notes
55 & 56 and accompanying text.
95 See generally Dellapenna, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3) (discussing statutory preferences for specific uses
of water in various states); supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
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policy makers from meaningfully regulating agricultural uses in states with
large farming industries.96 Farm uses that are exempted from the permit
schemes are still governed by common law riparian rights, which introduces
the problems associated with that system, as discussed above.97 For these
reasons, riparianism and regulated riparianism can not adequately support a
free-market tradable-permit system.
B. Prior Appropriation Systems
This section discusses prior appropriation regimes, including the standard
features of common law prior appropriation systems and how the common law
has been modified by state legislatures. It also discusses why prior
appropriation systems would not adequately support a market for tradable
water-use permits .
1. The Prior Appropriation System
The prior appropriation or appropriative rights system of water rights
developed in the western states as an alternative to common law riparian
rights.98 The basic principle of prior appropriation can be summarized as the
“person who is first in time to appropriate water, is the first in right,” meaning
the first user to establish a use gains priority to the water source over those
who come later.99 Under the common law rule, priority is established when a
user takes a “first step” of appropriating the water by investing time and money

96 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(a) (2009) (exempting farm uses from the
statutory permit scheme for the withdrawal of surface or ground waters); supra notes 57–66 and accompanying
text; see also Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 33 (“Irrigation accounts for 39 percent of all U.S. water
withdrawals and 81 percent of consumptive water uses.”).
97 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72–73 (noting this problem specifically in Georgia).
98 Owen L. Anderson et al., Introduction and Background, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
2, § 11.01, at 11-4 [hereinafter Anderson et al., Introduction]. The doctrine discussed in this subsection has
been referred to as both “prior appropriation,” id., and “appropriative rights.” E.g., Dellapenna, Water
Allocation, supra note 1, at 20.
99 Owen L. Anderson et al., Elements of Prior Appropriation, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 2, § 12.01, at 12-3 [hereinafter Anderson et al., Elements]. In Elements of Prior Appropriation, the
authors note that the doctrine has five basic elements: “(1) person; (2) first in time; (3) to appropriate; (4)
water; and (5) first in right.” Id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?,
76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 881 (2000) (“Prior in time, prior in right is the central dogma of western water law.”).
For a discussion of how the foundational principles of prior appropriation originated in the early days of the
American West, see Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 20–21.
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towards its actual use.100 When there is a shortage, the “oldest” appropriator
has the highest priority use right and a user with junior priority has no right to
use any of its allocation until there is enough water to fulfill the allocations of
all users ahead of it in the priority line.101 Some commentators have noted that
allocation based on temporal priority, rather than a hierarchy of reasonable or
necessary use, promotes waste because there is an incentive to withdraw the
maximum amount of water as soon as possible to gain priority.102 Because
junior use rights may be forfeited if there is only enough water to meet the
allocation of more senior users, the system is not conducive to transferable
rights.103 Unlike common law riparian rights, common law prior appropriation
does not require that the water be used only on riparian land, which might
actually facilitate the sale of use rights.104 However, there are usually
restrictions on where the water can be transported and used,105 which has
resulted in a lack of water markets in prior appropriation states even if there
may be the potential for them to exist.106
Most western states have now codified prior appropriation into the law.107
Generally, a permit process grants the use rights and establishes priority, with

100 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(b), at 12-8. Courts appear often to have decided
disputes over establishment of priority by looking to custom. See id. (discussing cases in which first-in-time
priority is disputed).
101 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that this principle may result in complete
forfeiture of junior rights in times of shortage).
102 E.g., id. at 23–24 (“Appropriators thus live in an environment where it is smart to overirrigate.”);
Tarlock, supra note 99, at 901 (“The strict enforcement of priorities tends to lead to inefficient use practices.
The cushion of a senior right combined with the ‘use it or lose it’ rules, abandonment and forfeiture, create
powerful incentives to use the maximum entitlement and to forego investments in water conservation
infrastructure.”).
103 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 24–26 (“The recognition and protection of thirdparty rights precludes true market transactions.”).
104 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(f), at 12-75.
105 Id. Generally, there are four types of restrictions: (1) restrictions that limit transfer from the water’s
area of origin; (2) restrictions on moving water out-of-state; (3) treatment of irrigation rights as running with
the land; and (4) restrictions on a junior appropriator’s ability to change the place of use when the change
improves the standing of the junior user. Id.
106 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 25 (“There never has been a market for appropriative
rights to any significant extent.”); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private
Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 577–78 (2007) (“These property rights did not historically lead to
the creation of active markets, however. This was primarily because the rules surrounding transfer made
trading so cumbersome that transfers rarely occurred.”).
107 See Anderson et al., Introduction, supra note 98, § 11.01, at 11-4, 11-5 (discussing the historical
evolution of the prior appropriation doctrine in the western states). See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 et seq.
(West 1971).
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the first appropriator establishing his standing by registering his use first.108
Most of these statutes require that an appropriator make “beneficial use” of the
water to retain priority rights; the definition of beneficial use varies from state
to state.109 For a use to be beneficial “the end use for the water must be a
generally recognized and socially accepted use (abstract benefit) and the water
must be put to that use and not ‘let run to waste.’”110 The beneficial use
requirement is significant because it has been the basis for courts finding that
an issued permit does not grant a vested property right to the water, but rather a
right to the water insofar as it is put to a reasonable use.111
Finally, prior appropriation users are subject to the “no injury” rule, which
holds that senior priority users cannot change the manner in which they use the
water if the change will injure junior users.112 For example, if a junior user
depends on the senior user returning water to the source, the junior user would
be injured if the senior user allows the water to be used at another location that
would not return it to the source.113 Thus, the no-injury rule would restrict the
senior user’s ability to sell the rights to water that had previously been returned
to its source after use, if the sale would result in the water being used in other
locations that would no longer return it to the original source.114
2. Why Prior Appropriation Will Not Support a Tradable Permit Market
for Water
Common law prior appropriation cannot adequately support a market for
tradable permits. First, any user who is not the first appropriator will
frequently face some risk that his rights will be surpassed by a higher priority
user, particularly in times of shortage.115 Second, some courts have placed
108 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(b), at 12-6. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1450 (West
1971) (priority established as of the date of the application for appropriation permit). For an assertion that
priorities are not actually enforced in prior appropriation states, see Tarlock, supra note 99.
109 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(c)(2) (surveying beneficial-use statutes from various
western states); Tarlock, supra note 99, at 882.
110 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(c)(2), at 12-26.
111 See id. § 12.02(e), at 12-66, 12-67 (surveying case law addressing the issue and noting that “the most
important restriction [on water rights] may be that an appropriator can only acquire the right to water for a
beneficial/reasonable use”).
112 Eric L. Garner & Janice L. Weis, Coping with Shortages: Managing Water in the 1990s and Beyond, 5
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 26, 29, 62 (1991); see also Owen L. Anderson et al., Reallocation, Transfers and
Changes, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 14.04(c) [hereinafter Anderson et al.,
Reallocation] (discussing the no-injury rule).
113 See Garner & Weis, supra note 112, at 62.
114 Id.
115 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 24.
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restrictions on where and how water can be used,116 which would lessen the
efficiency gains of a market system by limiting the number and type of buyers.
Third, the beneficial-use requirement, which is now codified in most prior
appropriation states, presents a risk because it may result in the forfeiture of
the right.117 Finally, prior appropriation users are subject to the “no injury”
rule, which can limit the types and locations of use from a particular water
source and therefore can limit the number of potential buyers of that source’s
water in a market.118
Therefore, prior appropriation systems in their current forms are not
adequate to support a market for tradable water-use permits because the rights
they grant to users, and the transferability of those rights, are uncertain. As
discussed above, riparianism and regulated riparianism are also inadequate
water-rights systems to support a tradable-permit market.119 A system that
more clearly defines property rights, allows for full alienability of water
permits, and brings all water users within the permit system would be more
suitable for a tradable water-permit market that more fully meets the goals of
conservation and efficient allocation.
II. MARKETS FOR TRADABLE WATER PERMITS
This Part will discuss how tradable-permit systems are structured.
Specifically, it will discuss the various characteristics and design features of a
tradable-permit system, and how the goals of the systems determine which
features are chosen for implementation. It also will address some common
criticisms of a free market, tradable-permit system for water.
A. Tradable Permits
This section discusses tradable permit systems. Subsection 1 discusses the
typical objectives of a tradable permit system and how the structure of such a
system works to achieve those objectives. Subsection 2 discusses the

116 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(f), at 12-75. See supra note 105 for specific
examples of the types of restrictions that courts have imposed.
117 See id. § 12.02(e), at 12-66 (noting that the extent of property rights in the water is uncertain because
of the beneficial-userule); supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the beneficial-use
requirement).
118 See Garner & Weis, supra note 112, at 62 (“The no-injury rule thus may prevent water transfers in
some instances . . . .”); supra notes 112–14 (discussing the no injury rule).
119 See supra Part I.A.3.
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considerations that policy makers should take into account in designing an
optimal system.
1. Goals and Structure of Tradable Permit Programs
Tradable permits can be used to allocate the amount of a given activity that
each participant in that activity may undertake.120 They are often used either to
limit the amount of a common resource that each participant can use or to limit
the amount of pollutants that each polluter can emit.121 Tradable permits have
also been used to sustain fisheries122 and regulate land use.123 The
Environmental Protection Agency has regulated pollution by allowing tradable
permits for fuel efficiency standards in vehicles and air pollution emissions,
among other things.124
Tradable permit schemes have typically been implemented as either a
credit-trading or a cap-and-trade system.125 In a credit-trading program, each
participant is allowed to engage in a standardized level of the activity, and if
the participant uses or pollutes less than its allowed amount, it gains credit for
that amount, which can then be traded with or transferred to a user who needs
the surplus to exceed the allowable limit.126 For example, in a program to
reduce environmentally harmful emissions, a polluter who emits less than the
limit gains an emission credit that can then be sold to a buyer who can then
emit more than the limit.127
A cap-and-trade system sets an overall level of use for a society and allows
participants to trade use rights. Its implementation involves three steps: (1)
determining the total level of acceptable activity; (2) allocating rights among
participants to engage in the activity; and (3) permitting and facilitating trading
120 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and
the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 483–84 (2000) (describing how governments
can use tradable permits to achieve “the socially optimal level of pollution”); Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 251
(describing tradable permits as a way to ration “access to the commons”).
121 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 616–17 (describing trading programs that manage pollution);
Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 251 (describing tradable permits as a method of allocating common resources).
122 Esty, supra note 80, at 1533–34 (describing tradable permit systems to regulate fisheries).
123 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 616.
124 Id. at 616 n.14. The legislation authorizing the trading of fuel-efficiency standards was later repealed.
Id.
125 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 265.
126 See id. at 265–66 (noting that activity below the limit “can be certified as surplus”). Tietenberg notes
that regulators sometimes have difficulty setting the base level of activity at an appropriate level to avoid
“unjustified credits.” Id. at 266.
127 See id. at 265 (citing emission-trading programs as an example of credit trading).
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of use permits.128 The primary goals of a cap-and-trade system are
sustainability and achieving the most efficient allocation of the right to engage
in the regulated activity.129 For example, in a cap-and-trade system to regulate
pollution, the government would determine the acceptable level of total
pollution for the society, and would then allocate the right to pollute among the
participants in the polluting activity, with the aggregate of all the participants’
pollution rights being equal to the total level of acceptable pollution.130 A
participant in the activity is then given the choice to use its allotted amount,
reduce use and sell its unused right, or buy additional rights to increase use.131
A primary distinction between the two systems is that one is able to limit
total activity, while the other is not.132 Credit trading does not limit the
aggregate amount of the activity because new participants can enter the process
and increase the overall level of activity.133 In a pollution-regulation system,
for example, new users can gain tradable credits simply by emitting less of the
pollutant than the allowable limit; these new participants and the new credits
that they generate would increase the aggregate level of activity.134
Conversely, in a cap-and-trade program the aggregate level of the activity is
defined without regard to the number of participants.135 New participants must
purchase permits from existing users to have the right to engage in the activity,
so the overall societal activity level or consumption does not change.136

128 Nash, supra note 120, at 483–85 (identifying and explaining the three steps in implementing a tradable
permit system for pollution control).
129 B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445, 445,
447 (2007).
130 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 617 (using the regulation of pollutants as an example of a cap-andtrade program with tradable permits).
131 Sinden, supra note 106, at 568 (describing the options of polluters in a cap-and-trade pollution control
system).
132 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447.
133 Id.
134 See id. (noting that this assumes no additional regulatory action is taken to counteract the additional
activity).
135 Id. As the author notes, this difference between the two systems has social implications because in a
cap-and-trade system every gain of a right by a participant means that another participant must lose that right.
Id. As discussed below, this element of the cap-and-trade system has led some critics to argue that poorer and
more rural water users would be harmed in a water market because they will be economically outmatched by
wealthier users. See supra Part II.B.
136 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447. (explaining that new users in a cap-and-trade system cause “some
or all users [to get] a smaller slice of the resource pie”).
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Through the market process, cap-and-trade programs using tradable permits
as currency aim to allocate resources to their best use.137 Indeed, in addition to
allowing control over the level of an activity for purposes of conservation or
environmental protection, tradable permit systems tend to increase economic
efficiency.138 Cap-and-trade systems and credit trading both provide an
incentive for participants in the regulated activity to increase their efficiency
because doing so will allow them to sell their rights to use or emit for a
profit.139 Those efficiency gains may come from advances in technology and
processes that decrease use or allow for more production without increasing
resource use.140 Tradable permit systems should also tend to increase the
economic value of the right to engage in the activity.141
However, the influence of stakeholders in the system’s structure and
implementation has the potential to create inefficiencies that negate the
benefits of a market system.142 One commentator cites inefficient alterations
to market transfer rules that are implemented to assuage concerns with the
initial allocation as an example of such influence.143 Another commentator
137 See id. at 445–48 (“In their ideal conception, cap and trade policies combine the policy goals of
sustainability and economic efficiency and offer the potential to achieve both simultaneously.”); Jonathan
Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12–
13 (2007) (describing the two most significant benefits of tradable permit programs as (1) economically viable
promotion of environmental sustainability and (2) highest economic allocation of scarce resources).
138 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447 (noting that in a cap-and-trade system, the “cap” achieves
conservation, while the “trade” promotes economic efficiency); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 620 (“If the
cap is set appropriately, marketable permits achieve the same level of protection as command-and-control
alternatives at a lower cost.”).
139 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 620 (using the air pollution permit system as an example of
encouraging efficiency because more efficient users profit from being able to sell their excess use rights);
Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 256 (“One of the most desirable aspects of tradable permits for resource users is
the ability to raise income levels for participants.”).
140 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush Administration and
Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 340 (2005) (“[P]ermit programs may encourage the
development of new environmental technology and processes that can achieve better results at lower cost.
Because individuals or companies can trade any reductions that they make in their regulated activities, the
regulated community has an incentive to develop less expensive, more effective means of making those
reductions.”). One example of how economic incentives can encourage users to be more efficient is the EPA’s
acid rain reduction program, which has resulted in an overall level of actual sulfur dioxide emissions that is
less than the total allowable amount. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 621 (noting that actual emissions in
1995 were forty percent less than the allowed amount). Salzman and Ruhl also note that the costs of the
reductions in the program were estimated to be forty percent lower than they would have been in a commandand-control system. Id.
141 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 260 (noting that tradable permit systems tend to increase the value of the
traded resource or lower the cost of pollution control, as the case may be).
142 Id. at 272–73.
143 Id.
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argues that politics influences the design, implementation, and ultimately the
success of tradable permit programs.144 Influential groups with valuable
interests at stake may be able to use the public’s lack of understanding of the
issues to influence the policy decisions related to a water market system.145
Stakeholders whose interests are not aligned with a water market may also try
to prevent such a system from being implemented at all.146
2. Considerations in the Design of Tradable Permit Programs
Policy makers considering a tradable permit system must carefully consider
how the system will be designed. Each aspect of the program can be tailored
to accomplish specific goals.147 The design choices, discussed in detail below,
include (1) how the permits will be initially allocated among users, (2) whether
the initial users will be given the permits for free, (3) how trading can be
structured to encourage participation by all users, and (4) how to remedy
problems arising from permits being used in circumstances different from
those for which they were allocated.
First, when implementing a tradable permit system, policy makers must
determine how the use permits initially will be allocated; this is one of the
most difficult issues that must be resolved at the outset of a tradable permits
system because of the established interests of existing participants.148
Common initial allocation schemes include those based on the use of each user
when the system is implemented, auctions,149 a lottery, and a first-come-firstserve program.150
144 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 445–46 (noting that because of political influence many cap-andtrade programs are not as economically beneficial as they might be). For example, Heinmiller notes that the
1997 emissions caps in the Kyoto Protocol are the result of a negotiated middle point between the interests of
environmental and emitters and do not represent a scientifically optimal level. Id. at 455.
145 Esty, supra note 80, at 1548–49 (“[T]he complexity and opacity of many environmental issues and the
public’s difficulty in perceiving its own interest make the risk of special interest manipulation much more
severe in the environmental realm than in other fields of regulation or government activity.”).
146 See Huffman, supra note 12, at 436 (“Any interest believing that it can serve its interest through the
political process is likely to oppose markets since the state will provide the resource to them for free.”).
147 See Nash, supra note 120, at 483–85 (describing in the context of pollution-control systems, the
decisions policy makers must make, including the geographic area of coverage, the nature and scope of the
permit rights, and the method of initial allocation).
148 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 269; See also Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 449 (“[C]ap and trade
policies are most needed and most likely to be introduced in situations of resource scarcity and
overexploitation where vested interests are already well established and cannot be ignored.”).
149 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 575–76 (describing allocation systems for tradable emissions
permit regimes, including an auction system and “grandfathering” in existing users).
150 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 269–70.
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Some commentators have noted that the initial allocation scheme is
sometimes dictated by politics rather than considerations of public good, and
one has stated that a free initial allocation based on existing use is “a necessary
ingredient” to implementing a tradable permit system.151 The initial allocation
is extremely important to the stakeholders because it provides access to an
economically valuable resource at potentially no cost, which could lead to a
“windfall” for the recipients of initial permits.152 For environmentalists or
conservationists wishing to hold emission or consumption permits, the initial
allocation may provide the most economically feasible way to do so; if the
initial allocation in a water market were free, environmental groups could
“retire” the permits without having to pay for them, assuming they were
allowed to take part in the initial allocation.153 Environmentalists in western
states have already used this method of preservation by purchasing water rights
and “retiring” them to protect downstream flow.154 In a cap-and-trade system,
the fact that the permit allocation is a “zero-sum” game—i.e., a system in
which every permit obtained by a given party is one less permit available for
all other parties—makes the initial allocation even more important.155
Likely because of the political influence of the existing users, most tradable
permit programs use initial allocations that favor existing users.156 One
drawback of giving free permits to existing users in the initial allocation is that
it will be more expensive for new users to access the system.157 Another is that
if users know the initial allocation is based on existing use, they may
inefficiently increase their use to increase their initial permit allocation.158 The
inefficient depletion problem could be mitigated by using historical data going
151

Id. at 254.
Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 450. The potential for a windfall has been cited as one reason watermarket systems should not be implemented. See, e.g., John L. Fortuna, Note, Water Rights, Public Resources,
and Private Commodities: Examining the Current and Future Law Governing the Allocation of Georgia
Water, 38 GA. L. REV. 1009, 1060 (2004).
153 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 450, 461. Environmentalists could hold the permit, thereby actively
conserving the resource by leaving fewer water-use rights available for consumption. Id. at 461.
154 Thompson, supra note 140, at 340–41 (describing the increasing activity of “water trusts” in
purchasing and “retiring” water rights). It should be noted that environmental groups that engage in “retiring”
water-use rights in western prior appropriation regimes might face opposition because change-of-use rules are
applied more rigorously to them than traditional users. Tarlock, supra note 99, at 902 (noting that this has
been the case in Oregon as applied to the Oregon Water Trust).
155 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 450 (noting that because of the nature of the process and the economic
value at stake, “this process is quite clearly political”).
156 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 270 (stating that in “virtually all implemented tradable permit programs
discussed in this article” existing users get free permits).
157 See id. at 271 (arguing that free initial allocations disadvantage new users).
158 Id.
152
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back beyond the time that users knew their level of use would determine their
initial permit allocation.159
Some commentators suggest that political and social influence in the
trading of permits is a significant reason that tradable permit programs are not
as successful in practice as they are in theory.160 For example, in a tradable
water permit system, agricultural water users in smaller communities may
resist selling their water withdrawal rights because of sentimental feelings
about the significance of the resource to their communities and families, even
when those users could expect to receive an economic benefit from selling
their withdrawal rights.161 Because agricultural use is often such a large potion
of water consumption,162 policy makers must consider ways to encourage
agricultural and other low-value users to participate in the market when it is
economically beneficial for them to do so.163
On the other hand, some reluctance to trade by smaller users may be useful
to the system by preventing a concentration of rights in too few users, which
may create too much market power for the concentrated holder and reduce the
efficiency of the market.164 More proactive methods of dealing with the
concentration problem have also been used, including placing limits on the
percentage of rights any one user may hold, government restriction of trades
that violate public policy, retaining a reserve to dilute the market if needed, and
requiring an annual auction in which each user must put up a percentage of
their rights for the auction.165
Finally, some commentators suggest that a tradable permit system must be
designed to address issues arising when a permit is used in circumstances other
159

Cf. id. (noting the problem exists when users know their allocation will be based on historical use).
See, e.g., Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 461 (describing how political and social pressure may prevent
lower value water users from participating in the market).
161 See id. (noting that these are typically low value users who could expect a financial gain from selling
their rights). Heinmiller discusses water trading in Australia and explains that tensions that have developed
between “buyers,” states with low-value irrigators, and “sellers,” states with higher value users. Id. at 463.
But see Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061 (noting the possibility of the opposite problem occurring—that a
water market could entice farmers in smaller communities to sell their use rights because the rights will be
more valuable to heavily populated areas).
162 Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838.
163 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 461–64 (noting the economic benefits of an open market, but
observing that some users’ reluctance to participate for social or political reasons can negate those benefits).
164 See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 273 (describing how concentration in fishery permits has resulted in
the decline of smaller fishing operations because they are being bought out by larger operations).
165 Id. at 273–74. The first two methods have been used in tradable permit markets for fisheries; the latter
two methods have been used in the United States’ sulfur pollution allowance program. Id.
160
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than those under which it was initially allocated.166 These issues are often
referred to as “nonfungibilities,”167 and they arise in “environmental trading
markets” in three different ways: space, type, and time.168 The most prevalent
of the three is nonfungibility of space.169 Nonfungibility of space can occur
when, as a result of the trade, the right to use or emit is exercised in a different
location than it would have been if it had not been traded, so the external effect
of exercising the right on the environment and third parties changes.170
Nonfungibility of space can result in “hot spots,” which can occur when there
is a concentration of an activity in one place.171 When this happens, the same
level of activity may have a greater marginal impact within the hot spot than it
would outside of it because there are fewer units of space to absorb the
activity.172 Commentators have noted that nonfungibility of space can disrupt
the economic efficiency of the market by introducing externalities and have
suggested that one way to address this problem is to restrict the geographic
area of trading.173 Another, less restrictive, potential remedy is to require
regulatory approval of trades to allow for assessment of nonfungibility.174
However, both of these methods would likely decrease the economic efficiency

166 See, e.g., Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 625 (noting that the currency of a tradable permit market
needs to be designed to address this issue).
167 Fungible is defined as “being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced by another
equal part or quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
507 (11th ed. 2004). Further, “oil, wheat, and lumber are fungible commodities.” Id. (emphasis added).
168 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 611, 625 (explaining fungibility as when “the things exchanged are
sufficiently similar in ways important to the goals of environmental protection”); see also Tietenberg, supra
note 12, at 280 (discussing breakdowns in theory when systems are implemented and noting as an example that
tradable permits are not always homogenous because time and place of use matters).
169 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 628.
170 See Nash, supra note 137, at 14 (describing “spatial differentiation” in the context of pollution control
programs and habitat trading programs).
171 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 627–28. The authors cite as an example a hot spot resulting
from a Los Angeles program that allowed industrial polluters to gain pollution credits by destroying older,
heavily polluting cars. Id. at 628. But critics pointed out that the refineries were closely concentrated; thus,
after the trades, the reduced emissions from the cars affected a 12,000-square-mile area, while the increased
emissions from the industrial polluters were now concentrated in a twenty-square-mile area. Id.; see also Nash
& Revesz, supra note 15, at 580–81 (discussing hot spots).
172 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 628 n.42 (“‘[I]t is immediately pointed out that a ton of any
particular kind of waste will do much more damage in some places than in others . . . .’” (quoting J.H. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 79 (1968) (alteration in original))).
173 E.g., Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 275 (discussing lack of homogeneity in transfers and geographic
restrictions on trades).
174 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 573 (proposing a system that requires regulatory pre-approval to
address nonfungibility in emission trading programs); see also Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 275 (noting that
the U.S. Wetlands program deals with “harmful spatial aspects” by requiring regulatory approval of trades).
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benefits of the market by disallowing some trades.175 Requiring regulatory
approval in a water market may also implicitly discourage trading because of
increased bureaucracy, particularly for smaller users.
One commentator has explained fungibility of type as simply “[a]pples are
traded for apples, not oranges.”176 Fungibility of type is most difficult to
assess when the object of the tradable permit, such as a parcel of land in habitat
trading, is not homogenous—i.e., no two parcels of land are exactly the
same.177 Finally, nonfungibility of time arises when a trade results in the
activity occurring at a different time than that contemplated by the permit,
causing the marginal effect to be different than the effect intended by the
permit.178
Of the three nonfungibilities, nonfungibility of space is likely to pose the
biggest problem in a tradable permit water market. Within the context of
tradable emission permits, water use may be analogous to what have been
termed “regional” pollutants—those that may travel many miles—”but the
affected region is defined by reference to where the emissions come from.”179
Perhaps analogously, water can travel over a broad area, but water shortages
experienced by downstream users may be related to upstream users’
consumption, potentially depriving downstream users of adequate resources to
fulfill their water-use rights.180
In addition, environmentalists believe that tradable permits increase the
potential for hot spots181 because existing users tend to be concentrated, which
will likely result in the initial allocation of permits being concentrated.182 This
phenomenon may also occur in a tradable water permit system if large
industrial users concentrated in cities purchase withdrawal permits from
175 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 275 (discussing geographic restrictions on trades and concluding that
“[s]patial issues can be dealt with within the tradable permit scheme, but those choices typically make transfers
more difficult”).
176 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 629.
177 Id. The authors also cite emission programs that bundle different types of polluting gases into one
category as an example of nonfungibility of type. Id.
178 Id. at 630; see also Nash, supra note 137, at 17–19 (discussing “temporal differentiation” in
environmental programs); Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 276 (discussing the “temporal flexibility”).
179 Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 576.
180 See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 277 (discussing issues that can affect the success of tradable permit
programs and noting that water regulators “must cope with the consequences of trades on downstream users”).
181 For a discussion of hot spots, see supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
182 Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 580–81. Nash and Revesz note that this problem also may stem
from older polluters being less likely to convert to better pollution control technologies, forcing them to buy
additional permits and worsening the hot spot. Id.
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agricultural users. The marginal effect of those withdrawals in areas of
concentration or water shortage would be greater than the effect of the same
withdrawal in an area without a concentration or shortage.183
The easiest way to address spatial fungibility issues is to restrict trading
within certain geographic zones.184 In a water market system, geographic
trading restrictions could prevent withdrawal permits that originate in rural
areas from concentrating in cities, where the resources would be unable to
fulfill the withdrawals that the permits prescribe.185 However, these types of
trading restrictions can undercut the economic efficiency gains of a market
system.186
Nonfungibility of time may occur in a tradable permit system for water if,
for example, many users purchased withdrawal permits when there was no
shortage but did not use them until a shortage occurred, causing a greater
impact at the time of use than would have occurred at the time of issuance.187
Restrictions that tie the time of the withdrawal to the time of the sale would be
one way to address nonfungibility-of -time issues in a water market.188
Of the three nonfungibilites, type is of the least concern in a water market.
Nonfungibility of type could conceivably occur because of hydrological
differences between groundwater and surface water; however, it is unclear
whether this distinction would have real implications for a water market
because there seems to be little practical difference between the two.189 Thus,
nonfungibility of type is of less concern than nonfungibility of space or time in
water permit trading, but if it were determined to be a legitimate concern, it
could be addressed by having a permit specific to each source.190
183 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 237 (discussing interbasin transfers and their potential negative impact
on “hydrologic capacity” in areas of shortage).
184 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 638.
185 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 573 (proposing a system that requires regulatory pre-approval to
address nonfungibility in emission trading programs); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 638–39 (discussing
geographic trading restrictions).
186 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 636 (discussing transaction costs and their negative effect on
economic efficiency); see also supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
188 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 642 (“Temporal nonfungibilities may be neutralized by
restricting trades to narrow time periods.”).
189 See Carol M. Rose, From H O to CO : Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
2
2
91, 99 (2008) (“It has long been known that groundwater and surface water are hydrologically related, and
there have long been calls to link their legal treatment.”).
190 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 640 (noting that in emissions-trading schemes, trades are
restricted to the same pollutant and mixing of pollutants does not occur).
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B. Criticisms of Water Market Proposals
Commentators have noted more potential negative consequences of water
markets than this Comment is able to address. However, it will discuss how a
tradable permit system might be structured to address the following concerns:
that (1) the states will be unable to control the sale of water resources to out-ofstate buyers because of the dormant Commerce Clause;191 (2) the agricultural
industry may be damaged because it will become more lucrative to sell water
rights than to use them for irrigation to harvest crops;192 (3) the permits would
increase water use as current users sell their excess rights;193 and (4)
transaction costs will negate economic gains from the system.194 This section
will discuss some ways a tradable permit system might be designed to address
these concerns.
Commentators have noted that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
could prevent states that adopt a free market for water rights from transferring
their water rights to out-of-state users.195 The Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine holds that states may not enact policies that are economically
protectionist or that discriminate against interstate trade in favor of intrastate
trade.196 The critics of the water market describe a scenario in which a private
holder of a large water use permit sells its rights to use water within the state to
the highest bidder, who happens to be out of state and plans to transfer the
water out of state; they contend that the state would be powerless, with narrow
exceptions, to stop such an interstate transfer.197 The seminal case on the
application of the Commerce Clause to water resources is Sporhase v.
Nebraska.198 In Sporhase, the Court held that groundwater is an article of
commerce subject to Dormant Commerce Clause analysis199 and struck down a
191 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 234 (“[T]he dormant commerce clause . . . could limit the power of
the state to prevent the export of its water resources to other states or countries . . . .”); Draper, supra note 10,
at 53 (discussing the Commerce Clause’s effect on tradable property rights for water); Fortuna, supra note 152,
at 1051 (describing the “substantial constitutional implications” that a market for water-withdrawal permits
would create).
192 E.g., Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061.
193 E.g., id.
194 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 51–52 (discussing transaction costs and “externalities”).
195 See supra note 191.
196 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (“The crucial inquiry, therefore,
must be directed to determining whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can
fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are
only incidental.”).
197 Draper, supra note 10, at 53.
198 458 U.S. 941 (1982), see also Draper, supra note 10, at 53.
199 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953–54.
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Nebraska law restricting interstate transfers of Nebraska groundwater as
unconstitutional.200
The Sporhase holding has several potential loopholes that might be used by
states to restrict out-of-state transfers. The Court acknowledges that a state has
a legitimate interest in conservation and preservation of its water resources “in
times of severe shortage”: A “State’s power to regulate the use of water in
times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its
citizens—and not simply the health of its economy—is at the core of its police
power.”201 The law in Sporhase was constitutionally flawed because its
reciprocity requirement did not further a legitimate interest—it would restrict
the transfer of water to its most beneficial use if that use was out of state and
would do so even when water was abundant at the point of withdrawal.202
Thus, the Court noted that a “demonstrably arid State conceivably might be
able to marshal evidence to establish a close means–end relationship between
even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and
preserve water.”203 This statement from the Court seems to indicate that a state
facing a severe shortage that threatens the health of its citizens could make a
compelling case to strictly protect its resources from out-of-state transfers.
Some commentators have noted states might also restrict out-of-state
transfers without running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis by
using a “basis of origin” rule,204 which would restrict transfers out of the
water’s geological base or “watershed.”205 Such a rule would seem to apply
equally to anyone out of the basis, whether they were in or out of state.206
Analysis of the constitutionality of such a rule is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but commentators have noted that it is unlikely that the rule would
be upheld under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because protectionist
policies within subdivisions in a state are no more constitutional than if they

200 Id. at 960. The Nebraska law required any person or entity that wanting to transport water from
Nebraska for use in another state to apply for a permit, which would only be granted if the state to which the
water was being transported granted reciprocal rights to transfer water to Nebraska. Id. at 944.
201 Id. at 956.
202 Id. at 958.
203 Id.
204 E.g., Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 619.
205 Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 235–36 (proposing that Georgia could impose transfer restrictions based
on watersheds for the purpose of protecting “hydrologic integrity”).
206 See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 619 (“Proponents argue that there is no discrimination because
all potential users outside the boundaries of the watershed are treated alike . . . .”).
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were implemented by the state.207 And a basis-of-origin restriction may also
lessen the viability of a water market if transfers could not be made from areas
with excess water resources to areas with shortages.208
Even if Sporhase leaves states completely unable to prevent out-of-state
transfers of their water resources, interstate transfers would help promote the
highest economic use of water resources by expanding the potential market and
providing an economic benefit to the selling permit holder.209 If each state
participating in the market were to allow tradable permits for water use, each
would stand to benefit from the economic efficiency promoted by a freemarket system, even if those tradable permits flow across state lines.210 The
economic efficiency that is realized by free trade across state borders is the
basis underlying the Commerce Clause’s invalidation of protectionist state
policies.211 Under the proposed system, a state would at the very least be able
to regulate the total depletion of its resources through management of the
allowable withdrawal attached to each permit, while still gaining the economic
benefit from maximizing the efficient use of its resources.212
Next, some commentators argue that the force of supply and demand,
which could drive prices for water in the market higher, would harm the ability
of individual households and agricultural users to obtain, or retain, water-use
rights, and further, that, aside from the basic human need for water, this could
lead to destruction of smaller communities that rely on small agricultural
operations.213 However, each municipality would receive an initial allocation
207 Id. at 619–20 (discussing Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992), which invalidated a state law that isolated its counties from solid waste
produced outside of the county).
208 Cf. Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 236 (noting that in Georgia permit transfers from agricultural areas to
Atlanta could violate a prohibition against interbasin transfers).
209 See Nash, supra note 120, at 484–85 (noting that geographic restrictions reduce the potential number
of participants, thus increasing the cost of finding trading partners). For a discussion of the economic benefits
of a market system, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
210 See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 607 (“Reducing the size of a market area by limiting water
exports constrains the ability to move water from inefficient uses to more efficient ones.”).
211 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (“‘This principle that our economic unit is
the Nation . . . has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units. . . . [W]hat is ultimate is the
principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.’”
(quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949)).
212 See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 604 (arguing that limiting a market geographically sacrifices
possible gains from efficient allocation).
213 E.g., Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1058, 1061; Neuman, supra note 15, at 463 (noting that water markets
can lead to a concentration of rights in the wealthy). But see Huffman, supra note 12, at 435–36 (noting this
argument from critics, but dismissing it as an “[un]persuasive reason to oppose the creation of water
markets”). For a discussion of how this issue has been addressed in tradable permits for fisheries, see
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of withdrawal permits sufficient to supply its citizens with water for domestic
use under the proposed system. In times of severe shortage, sufficient water to
meet basic human needs would take precedent. In Sporhase, the Court
indicates that state governments have wide latitude to ensure the availability of
water for its citizens.214 If a water provider were forced to pay high prices to
increase its supply and were forced to pass those increases to domestic
consumers, water subsidies could be implemented to ensure that those who
may not be able to afford higher prices have access to water.215 Such policies
recognize the conflict between ultimate economic efficiency and the desire for
all users to have an equal ability to utilize the market for their benefit. Policy
makers are allowed to make judgments that strike the appropriate balance
between those goals.216
A related argument against tradable permits is that because agricultural
users typically do not use their full allocation of water rights under current
laws, overall use would increase if they were allowed to sell excess use rights
on an open market and the shortage problems would be exacerbated.217
However, in a system where the initial allocation is not based on the current
withdrawal rights, but rather on a reasonable amount actually needed to sustain
current operations, the overall withdrawal amount would not increase by a
large margin.218 Agricultural users would then be encouraged to increase the
efficiency of their water use219 so that they could sell the remaining withdrawal
Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 274. For a discussion and examples of how a price or value can be determined
for water in a market, see Willey & Graf, supra note 65, at 331–34.
214 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (“[A] State’s power to regulate the use of water in
times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens . . . is at the core of its
police power.”).
215 See Huffman, supra note 12, at 436 (“If society cares about fairness, it is possible to create needstested subsidy programs to assure that the poor get the water they need for basic human survival.”).
216 See Esty, supra note 80, at 1572 (“[E]ffective environmental procedures may not take full cognizance
of other social values such as justice or equity. If all the [resources] are owned by the rich, a property rightsbased allocation system may be efficient, but it will not be just. Optimal environmental governance must
therefore be understood to be both relative and contextual. A theory of optimal governance defines a
theoretical goal and a process, but does not offer a definitive answer to every policy question.”).
217 Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061.
218 The initial allocation cap based on current use would also alleviate concerns that tradable permits
based on current rights, which often allow withdrawal amounts much greater than those actually used, would
provide a “windfall” to current users. See id. at 1060 (arguing that a windfall would result for current permit
holders). Profit for permit holders would come from efficiency gains in their operations or reduced use—not
from selling excess use initially allocated to them. For additional discussion of why the “windfall” criticism of
water markets is unfounded, see Huffman, supra note 12, at 435.
219 Inefficient agricultural uses may include irrigation that produces relatively low-value crops, unlined
ditches used for water diversion and low-technology flood irrigation. See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at
603 n.5.
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rights for a profit to users with increasing demand, such as growing population
centers.220 Because agriculture is such a large portion of consumptive uses of
water,221 the improvements in efficiency that would be promoted by a cap on
withdrawal would free up water for other uses.222 One commentator argues
that this excess water would allow agricultural businesses at once to continue
their operations and sell remaining water rights.223 Further, these gains in
conservation through more efficient use may outweigh the potential threat to
the agricultural industry.224
As with any market system, there is a risk that transaction costs may erode
any economic gains.225 Generally, transaction costs include not only the
transacting parties’ costs, but also costs to third parties that are not reflected in
the price of the transaction.226 The more that the system and permits are
tailored to address nonfungibilities,227 are restricted by geographic area,228 or
are regulated to protect certain users,229 the more economic efficiency is lost to
transaction costs because increased regulation increases the costs of the

220 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 263–64
(2000) (“The government can allocate reductions based on historical use or seniority and rely on the market for
meeting economic needs and changing demands.”). Professor Thompson notes that in western states, “the
transfer of merely a tenth of current agricultural water can more than double the water available for growing
metropolitan areas.”
Id. at 264; see also Thompson, Jr., supra note 15, at 195 (“Tradable
permits . . . encourage entities to find ways of further improving their performance since the entities can then
sell their unneeded permits . . . .”); supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
221 Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838 (stating that irrigation is “generally the most
heavily consumptive use of water”); Thompson, Jr., supra note 220, at 264 (stating that agricultural use
composes eighty percent of water use in the western part of country).
222 See Neuman, supra note 15, at 468 (stating that smaller agricultural users, who are often the most
inefficient, currently do not have an economic incentive to improve).
223 Id. at 473 (“[I]nsisting that urban or conservation-driven water demands are a threat to the agriculture
industry’s viability ignores the tremendous potential for conserving water in the agricultural sector.”).
224 Id.
225 See Draper, supra note 10, at 51–52 (discussing potential transactions costs in a water market and
stating that “[t]he most serious direct economic consequence of for-profit water trading is the inability of
bilateral water transactions between sellers and buyers to consider the effects of the transaction on third
parties”); Nash, supra note 120, at 485 (“[G]overnment must be careful that the transaction costs do not
become so high that they preclude the establishment and maintenance of a viable market.”).
226 Draper, supra note 10, at 51; Willey & Graff, supra note 21, at 335.
227 See Part II.A.2 for a discussion of nonfungibilities.
228 Nash, supra note 120, at 484–85 (noting that geographic restrictions reduce the potential number of
participants, thus increasing the cost of finding trading partners).
229 See supra Part II.A.2. For example, constructing regulatory barriers to trade that are designed to
protect agricultural communities from loss of resources.

PUCKETT GALLEYSFINAL

1032

6/25/2010 10:33 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

trade.230
Transaction costs occurring outside of the trade noted by
commentators include depleted resources for downstream users caused by
upstream use231 and the potential damage to the agricultural industries and the
small communities they support because those users may find it more
profitable to sell water rights than to use them for irrigation.232 Because of this
tradeoff between economic efficiency on the one hand and an optimal system
design to protect against nonfungibility and harm to third-parties on the other,
“the policy instrument’s viability rests on a balance.”233 In a tradable permit
water market, policy makers would have to determine the point at which the
non-economic and third-party costs of the market are outweighed by the
benefits of water conservation and efficient allocation, a determination that
might itself be deemed a transaction cost.234
III. WHAT WOULD A MARKET FOR TRADABLE WATER PERMITS LOOK LIKE?
As described in Part II, tradable permit systems are typically structured in
one of two forms: credit trading and cap and trade.235 This Comment argues
that water markets are needed to conserve and efficiently allocate a scarce
resource through a market system that caps aggregate use and that tradable
permits should be the currency of such a system because they can be structured
as secure property rights that are freely tradable. This system would allow
policy makers to determine and impose a sustainable level of use and, through

230 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 636 (explaining that increased cost in design and management of
the system may lessen participation in trading); Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 273 (“[A]dditional restrictions
tend to raise transaction costs and to limit the cost-effectiveness of the program.”).
231 See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 106, at 579 (“One right holder’s diversion of surface water can have
important impacts on downstream users.”).
232 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 51; Sinden supra note 106, at 581.
233 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 636. Salzman and Ruhl note that some level of nonfungibility is
desirable, if not critical, to a functioning market; otherwise there would be no need for the participants to trade.
Id. at 645. The more nonfungible the currency (the permit), the more active the market will be. Id. at 645–46;
see also Draper, supra note 10, at 51 (“[I]f the rights and costs of third parties are included in the water rights
transfer, transaction costs rapidly become exorbitant.”).
234 See Draper, supra note 10, at 51 (“In any large and complex hydrologic system, the difficulty and
expense of structuring the necessary third-party transaction costs frustrates the development of markets unless
the law chooses to disregard the externalities.”); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 637 (noting that
“aggressive market construction” aimed at reducing external effects is dangerous because it can cause even
more problematic flaws in the ability of the market to function); Sinden, supra note 106, at 582 (“[W]hen
ecological and community impacts are added to the mix, the government’s role in approving trades must
necessarily shift from one of simply facilitating bargaining among affected parties to making substantive
judgments about the level of impact that is acceptable or desirable.”).
235 See supra notes 125–27.
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the use of the market, would encourage users to consume the resource more
efficiently.236
Both cap and trade and credit trading tend to promote economic
efficiency,237 but credit trading does not cap use.238 In areas with rapidly
growing populations and industry,239 the inability of regulators to cap the
aggregate level of consumption would decrease their ability to maintain the
desired level of conservation as new users are added to the system.240
Therefore, credit trading is not as effective as a cap-and-trade system for
maintaining sustainable levels of water use. Under this proposed system,
policy makers would determine an annual level of sustainable use and then
divide the use rights, which would automatically renew each year among the
users.241
For a cap-and-trade system to effectively regulate aggregate use, all water
users must be accounted for within the system.242 Therefore, current permit
systems under regulated riparian243 and prior appropriation244 systems, which
exempt some large-scale users from permit requirements, must be expanded
and modified to eliminate wide-ranging exemptions. In many states, this
would require currently exempted users—often agricultural users—to be
brought into the permit system.245 Continuing to allow a large portion of water
use to be largely unregulated cripples the ability of the system to conserve
resources because often the largest categories of use are the ones out of the

236

See supra notes 15 & 220 and accompanying text.
Credit trading promotes more efficient use of resources because users can sell credits they have
accumulated by becoming more efficient. See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 265.
238 See generally Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 445–48.
239 For example, it has been estimated that metro-Atlanta’s population will double over the next twentyfive years. Shelton, supra note 9.
240 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447 (“[I]f the number of users in a credit program increases,
aggregate resource use will also increase . . . .”).
241 Cf. Nash, supra note 137, at 14 (noting that in pollution programs, the level is usually set on an annual
basis).
242 For a discussion of how exempting certain users from the permit system impairs the ability of the
system to effectively conserve water, see supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
243 See supra Part I.A.2.
244 See supra Part I.B.1.
245 See supra Part I.A.2. There may be a level of use at which it is no longer productive to regulate the
consumption by a user. For example, the cost of regulating a rural household withdrawing water from a
ground well might be greater than the benefit. However, this Comment takes the position that such decisions
should be made on the basis of value added to the goals of the system—not on the basis of political influence.
See supra notes 142–46.
237
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reach of regulators.246 The system proposed by this Comment would bring
most users247 within the permit system so that all water use would be regulated.
Water rights that are traded in an active market must be secure property
rights so that participants can be certain of what rights they are buying and
selling, and they must be transferable.248 As described in Part I, water rights
under current laws are often uncertain, as is their transferability.249 Under the
proposed system, a use permit would specify how much water the owner is
entitled to withdraw within a given time period, and it would not be subject to
the rights of any other users or permits. The permit would automatically renew
annually.250 Thus, once a permit is obtained, the user would be certain that his
property right in the permit’s allowable use would remain secure.251
Under the proposed system, permits initially would be allocated through a
free distribution to existing users based on existing and historical use.252 As
noted in Part II.B, one criticism of water markets has been that overall
consumption would actually increase because users who do not currently use
all the water to which they have a common law right would sell their excess
use rights once a market is available to do so.253 However, if the initial
allocation of use permits were based on existing or historical use, rather than
on available common law or current permit use rights, overall water
consumption would not increase.254 Basing allocation on actual use also
alleviates the problem of giving existing users a windfall because they will not
have an initial excess of rights available for sale; rather, they will have to
reduce use or become more efficient in their use to realize profits from selling
permits.255

246

See Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838 (noting that irrigation use is generally one of
the most consumptive uses).
247 See supra note 245.
248 See supra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text.
249 See supra Part I.A.3 & Part I.B.2.
250 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
251 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 617 (discussing environmental trading markets and stating that
the rights attached to the tradable permit compel “the government [to] create[] a new form of property,” which
can be characterized as the right to engage in a certain activity or use a common resource).
252 See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the initial allocation is based
on historical use.
253 Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061.
254 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
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A water market should be structured to attempt to alleviate any
nonfungibilities that exist. As discussed in Part II.A.2, nonfungibility of space
is most likely to present a problem in water markets, although nonfungibility of
time and type may also be issues, but to a lesser extent.256 Nonfungibility of
space should be prevented to the extent that it creates harmful hot spots that
occur when permits are concentrated in an area where the marginal effect of
use in the hot spot is greater than it would be if the use were to occur where the
permit originated.257
In the proposed system, nonfungibility-of-space issues could be managed
by monitoring all trades.258 Geographic zones would be delineated by
matching levels of use with available resources, and trades would be tracked to
determine the concentration of permits in each area. For example, permits
flowing from rural agricultural areas to cities would be monitored because they
would be moving to an area of greater consumption.259 Regulators would then
be able to block trading activity if it appeared that hot spots were going to
strain the water resources in the concentrated area or if overuse in the
concentrated area would deprive downstream users of their use rights.260
However, the level at which trades would be blocked must be carefully
considered so as not to prevent the market from functioning inefficiently and
imposing burdensome transactions costs that negate the efficiency gains; this
calls for a balance that policy makers ultimately will have to determine—a task
that admittedly is a difficult one.261
Nonfungibility of time seems to be most troublesome in times of severe
water shortage. For example, adequate resources may not be available to
fulfill a withdrawal permit during a severe water shortage even though there
may have been adequate resources at the time of the trade. Nonfungibility of
time has been addressed in other tradable permit systems by imposing time
limits on tradable permits.262 However, in the proposed water market,
256

See supra Part II.A.2.
See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 628 n.42. For a discussion of hot spots, see supra notes 171–
72 & 181–82 and accompanying text.
258 Cf. Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 573 (proposing an emission-trading system that requires preapproval of trades based on a model that assesses the marginal effect of the trade).
259 For a discussion of the possible effects of transfers from agricultural areas to cities, see Fortuna supra
note 152, at 1062–63.
260 For a discussion of hot spots, see supra notes 171–72 & 181–82 and accompanying text.
261 For a discussion of transaction costs, see supra notes 225–34.
262 For example, in emissions-trading programs, an emission permit may have a time limit attached within
which the allowable emission must occur. See, e.g., Salzman and Ruhl, supra note 25, at 642 (describing
temporal limits in trading programs).
257
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imposing time limits would be impractical because withdrawal rights would be
measured by the amounts withdrawable within each year, and the right to
would renew annually.263
One possible solution would be to review the problem arising from
nonfungibility of time before each renewal period begins, allowing for an
adjustment in use amounts if, at that time, resources were inadequate for the
amount of existing permitted use. However, as noted above, the tradable
permit grants a right to water withdrawal that must be secure and certain; it
must continue to renew at the same amount in each new period.264 Thus, it
may not be possible to impose time limits on the use of water permits while
still maintaining their value to market participants. A perfect solution to this
difficult issue may not exist; regulators will need to have an accurate forecast
of resources at the program’s outset to avoid permitting too much use in the
market during times of shortage. But the value of having use rights attached to
the permit that are certain outweigh the risks of nonfungibility of time.
This proposed system allows regulators and policy makers to achieve a
sustainable level of overall water use by placing a cap on total use. It also
provides incentive for water resources to be used more efficiently because
users who use less water can benefit economically by selling their unused
rights. Rights to use water resources, and the ability to transfer those rights,
will be secure and free from the vagaries of riparian rights and prior
appropriation regimes, allowing participants in the market to buy and sell a
secure asset freely.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that a market system for water-withdrawal
rights, using tradable permits as its currency, should be implemented by states
to address water shortages. A cap-and-trade structure would allow policy
makers to determine a sustainable level of water use and to impose that
sustainable limit by requiring all water use to be accounted for within the
permit system. Implementing a cap-and-trade permit system would allow
regulators to set conservation goals and implement long-term strategies rather
than the short-term measures that traditionally have been used during

263
264

See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 250 & 251 and accompanying text.

PUCKETT GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

6/25/2010 10:33 AM

TRADING WATER

1037

shortages.265 This system also would promote efficient allocation of water
resources through the market structure.
This Comment has argued that current water-rights regimes do not provide
adequate property rights or alienability of those rights to support a market for
tradable water permits. Therefore, a tradable-permit system for water use
would have to be implemented within a new water-rights system that would
ensure secure property rights and full transferability among users. These
permits would be issued to current users at no charge and would be based on
the user’s current and historical use level. By capping aggregate water use and
promoting more efficient use of water resources through a market structure,
water shortages can be addressed with long-term planning and conservation
through permanent systems, rather than with inadequate short-term measures.
P AUL W. P UCKETT∗
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